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Summary  findings
On September 30, 1990, the first World Summit for  An encouraging consensus is emerging - both in the
Children promised to reduce child mortality and  literature and in the policies of international agencies
malnutrition. It set targets to be reached by the year  concerned with child labor - that action, to be effective,
2000. Although it established no explicit goals on child  must aim first to protect children and improve their
labor, the targets included basic education for all  living and working conditions. This implies a less
children and the completion of primary education by at  stigmatized view of child labor, and the recognition that
least 80 percent of children.  child labor itself can be used as a targeting device to help
Meeting these goals will reduce child labor, say  children through  health, nutrition, schooling, and other
Grootaert  and Kanbur.  interventions.
The evidence they review shows that education  In the long term, the objective of eliminating child
interventions play a key role in reducing child labor and  labor must be approached  through legislative action
should play a key role in its eventual abolition.  combined with social and economic incentives that take
But other interventions are also needed, including  into account not only the types of child labor and child
legislative action, appropriate labor market policies,  labor arrangements in a country but that country's
fertility interventions, the adoption of technology, and  institutional and administrative capacity.
better job opportunities for parents. There  must also be
advocates for better conditions for working children and
for the empowerment  of children and their families.
This paper - a product of the Office of the Vice President, Development Economics - is one in a series of background
papers prepared for World Development Report 1995 on labor. Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Anju Sachdeva, room S5-029, extension 82717,  or Michele
Youssef, room J5-250, extension 34614  (48 pages). May 1995.
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like to thank Michael  Walton and the 1995  WDR Team for useful feedback  on an earlier version
of the paper, and Susan Cochrane  for sharing her many  insights  into the links between  fertility,
education  and child labor.1.  Introduction
Child labor is upsetting. The popular images in the developed  world are drawn
from Dickens  and the "dark, satanic  mills'  of the industrial  revolution  on the one hand, and the
sweatshops  and street children  of the cities of the developing  world on the other. A common,
and natural enough, reaction in developing countries has been legislation  to ban child labor,
following the  historical lead of  the  developed world as  it emerged from  its period of
industrialization.  In fact, trade sanctions  are being recommended  in some developed  countries,
against the exports of developing  countries which use child labor. Many, including  developing
country governments,  see this as a thinly disguised  protectionist  device. Many others, economists
among them, have argued that child labor legislation,  even if it could be enforced, is not the
only way, or necessarily  the best way, of tackling the issue.
Against  this background,  this paper presents  on overview  of the recent literature
on child labor. Section 2 considers the problems of defining child labor - conceptual and
empirical, and discusses  some  recent estimates  of the magnitude  of the problem.  Section  3 moves
to a discussion  of the determinants  of child labor, focussing  first on supply  and then on demand.
Section 4 sets out the welfare  economics framework within which policy interventions  can be
analyzed  In  light of  this,  Section 5  assesses a  range  of policy interventions, including
legislation. Section  6 concludes  the paper.
The basic message of this paper is that there seems to us to be an emerging
consensus  in the literature.  The policy response to child labor will have to vary depending  upon
which types of child labor and child labor arrangements  are prevalent, and depending  upon the-2  -
institutional  and administrative  capacity  of the country in question.  While  child labor legislation
is an important  component  of the policy  package, this by itself  is neither necessary  nor sufficient
for making a rapid and significant  dent in the problem. It will have to be accompanied  by a
range of incentives, for schooling, for example, and a range of targeted interventions. This,
together  with equitable  economic  growth, is what will eventually  reduce  child labor to levels that
can be addressed by legislation.
2.  The Nature and Magnitude  of Child Labor
How much child labor is there  in the world?  The answer to  this question
depends, of course, on what one means  by child labor. At one extreme,  all non-educational,  non-
leisure time of individuals below a certain age can be counted as child labor. At the other
extreme, only full-time  employment  in economic  activity  would  be counted.  The former includes
light work after school or in school holidays, which helps in skill acquisition, while the latter
excludes part-time engagement  in such horrendous activities  as child prostitution. Part of the
definitional  problem arises because when most people talk of child labor they mean "bad" child
labor such as prostitution, or scavenging,  or backbreaking  work on a construction site, or long
hours in a carpet factory, etc. Such 'bad" child labor can be part-time  or full-time, and a child
can both engage in schooling  and in "bad" child labor. Getting comparable  estimates for such
child labor is irnpossible,  not least because  what constitutes  "bad" child labor is itself in dispute.
Thus the term child labor covers a wide range of situations,  to which the ethical,
economic  and legal response  could be very different  (see Box 1: Four child workers). To begin-3-
with, it is not clear how to define  "child". In the West, it is customary  to do so  by chronological
age, but in many societies  cultural  and social factors enter as well  (Rodgers  and Standing,  1981).
The evolution of a  child to adulthood  passes through socially and biologically defined life
phases, over which the degree of dependence  and the need for protection  of the child gradually
declines, e.g., in many societies  an apprentice even if only eight or nine years old is often not
considered a child - a determination  based on social status rather than age (Morice, 1981).  In
that sense too, many societies,  especially  poor rural ones, do not view child work as "bad".
Rather, it is part of the socialization  process which gradually introduces the child into work
activities and teaches the child survival  skills. This view is present in many African  countries
(Bekombo, 1981; Agiobu-Kenuner,  1992).-4-
Box 1. Four child workers.
:  :  ..  ....  ...  ..  ;:  ..............  :  :  - :  Rox  l  Four  chfld  workers:  :  ::  ::.  '  . ...... .. . ......
IDeep.,  school gurtin  rural  Maharashtra-:  ;I:  ;  ::  :-;1  --  - :  :-;  -- :: : 
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  ....  ..  . ..  ....  ... ~X
Deepa  is ten  yve  old and attends primary school.  She is lucky  because  many girls at her age must 
stay home to take care of ther younger siblings. Yet,. every day after-school,  she must help her:  father on  h:.e farm,
together  :with  her two older.:brothers.:  After:  they:  finish the farm work.  they retum home to do their homework  and io
:tudy. Deepa and her brothe  aret  among millions  'of schooi children n india, and the develop  ig  worid at lge,  who
combine  going  tQ school with  work at the householdfarn  or other enterprise. The work probably  harms their study  effort : . : ,,  ,  . . - : . :  - ,::  :  . :  -,  E  7  . ,  .-  :  --  :  - . - - -:  . .:  . .::  -:  .:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rie.eor  pbbbl.  i  h
t> some degree.but theiu  workris  also essential  to make it possibk for-the  household  to afford the children's schoolimg.:..-
Child lasbr leg  an  usuy  exempts  t  fhme  production  activies from r  ai
Adc,  street  traer in Lagosv.  :-  ...  ....  . - .:..  ......
Ade isin  'the  last class of primarry  school, and like more  than one third of his class mates  he:hawks
goods on the streets after school hours. Like :most of the children, he startd  trading on the street.  beforeIhis ninth....
birthday. Some  children  have fixed.  spots on street comners,  fuel stations  or entrances  of large buildings,  others peddle'.i
their wares from place to place  along the streets, and others go from door to door in residential  areas. The work  is not
without  risk. The  children  are exposed  to air pollution,  vehicle accidents,  abduction  and sexual  exploitation  andassault.
Most street hawkers originate  from lower socio-economic  status homes, and their parents rarely received.  more than
primary  education.  While:a  majority  of their fathers have wage employment,  most  mothers  are traders  too. Street trading:
by children  is a profitable  business:  many children replenish  the stock of merchandise  they carry several times duringr
a selling period, and manage  to sell more than an adult trader. Their:  income  is hence a significant  contribution  to
household  income.  For most children  their earnings  also go towards  purchase  of school  books  and other supplies. And
while street  trading  children  tend to perform  poor academically,  they  often  excel in  various  social  and leadership  qualities.
Juan, quarry worker  in Bogoti
Most of the quarries in Bogota  operate without  a permit.  from the city authorities.  They use low
technology  extraction  methods.  After large rocks  have been extracted  with.  bulldozers  and explosives,  they are pulverized
in mecbanical  crushers.  Workers  then  separate  the material  according  to size.  Children  use shovels  and sieves  in this task.
Juan, at age 13, is among  the older children  workers in the quarries..  One  fifth of them are less than 10  years old and
some started  at age five. Two thirds  of the children  have worked  at the quarries  between  one and five years. fix  spite  of'
the hard work, 50 percent  of them  attend school,  often  in the evening  at a community  center. Surprisingly,  only  one third
said that they disliked  the work, the others saw it as learning a trade or were proud that their earnings  helped  support
their families.  Most of the children  live in squatter  settlements  at the outskirts  of Bogota.  Their  parents  have little or no
education, and most have no stable employment. They justify  their children's work by saying that leisure leads to crime
and by pointing at the high unemployment in Colombia,  even among well-educated adults.
Taeng,  masseuse  in Bangkok
Taeng left her native village in N.  Thailand when she was 17 to come to Bangkok. Most girls who
.go  South'  are 17-18, or sometimes younger,  with only a few yearS of primary education. Often they have an older
sister, or aunt,  who already works  'at  the coffee shop'.  Sometimes an agent, who lent their parents money to build a
house,  arranges  the placement of the  girls.  They  often  come  from  the least-endowed villages where there  are  few
opportunities for local employment outside agriculture. and where there is a long agricultural off-season. If they're  lucky,
the girls wind up working in an 'upscale'  parlor,  which provides them with accommodation and regular medical checks.
But if a bond is involved, the agent locks up the girls and they have no personal freedom. Most girls see themselves  as
family breadwinners - they do not Iike what they do, but they know they must remit money to help pay for daily living
expenses of their families, for the school fees of their brodters  and sisters, to dig a well or build a house. Many return
home after a number of years, to a mix of sympathy and derision from their fellow villagers.
Note:  Thesc cases ar  authors' composite  consructions based on case studies in Jejeebhoy, 1993. Oloko. 1991, Salazar, 1988,
Phonzpaichit.  1982. Weiner, 1991, and Myers,  1991.-5-
The concept of "work" is equally problematic  to apply to the range of activities
which children do. They can range from help with domestic  work, to work in the household
enterprise or farm, to wage  work. It can be light artisanal  work, trading, or heavy physical  work
(see Rodgers and Standing,  1981, for a useful typology  of children's activities).  For the purpose
of defuiing a policy towards child labor, both the nature of the work and the nature of the
relationship  between the child and the employer  must be considered.  A key element is whether
the arrangement  is "exploitative". In the extreme, this can take the form of bonded labor, quasi-
slavery, or feudal relationships. In many cases a debt incurred by the parents is the "bond",
which forces the child to work towards repayment  of the debt. It is estimated  that in South  Asia
there are several million child bonded laborers (ILO, 1992). However, other aspects of child
labor can also be considered exploitative,  such as when the child starts full-time work at too
early an age, or works too many hours, or when the work puts excessive  physical, social and
psychological  strains on the child and hampers  the child's development  in these areas (UNICEF,
1986; ILO, 1992).
The ILO (1993)  has recently  attempted to produce statistics  on child labor based
on a uniform definition  - economically  active population  under the age of 15. The discussion  in
ILO (1993) highlights the difficulties that arise in terms of data availability  - eventually, a
number of sources had to be used, including  a set of specially  designed questionnaires  sent to
200 countries and territories (the response  rate was uneven  across  regions). In any event, on the
basis of  returns from 124 countries, the ILO estimates that there are  about 78.5 million
economically active children under 15 years in 1990. The figure for children 10-14 vears  old
is 70.9 million, with a participation  rate of 13.7 percent. Table 1 presents  the figures bv region.- 6 -
It will be seen that participation  rates are highest in Africa, and particularly  high in Easterm
Africa. The lower figure in Southern Asia may relate to country  coverage.
Table 1. Labor force participation  (PR) of children 10-14 years old by major  geographical  areas, 1990.
Major geographical  areas  Economically  active ('000)  PR (%)
World  70,929  13.7
Africa  16,681  22.0
Eastern Africa  7,965  32.9
Middle Africa  1,848  21.6
Northern Africa  982  5.8
Southern  Africa  100  4.6
Western Africa  5,785  24.2
Americas  4,723  7.9
Caribbean  216  6.8
Central America  1,022  10.3
North America  0  0.0
South America  3,485  12.8
Asia  49,287  15.3
Eastern  Asia  22,448  20.0
South-Eastern  Asia  5,587  11.1
Southern  Asia  20,143  14.0
Western  Asia  1,109  6.7
Europe  90  0.3
Eastern Europe  4  0.1
Northern Europe  1  0.0
Southern  Europe  84  0.8
Western Europe  0  0.0
Oceania  148  6.9
Australia-New  Zealand  0  0.0
Melanesia  147  23.9
Micronesia  0  0.0
Polynesia  1  4.8
Due to rounding, totals may not be equal  to their constituent  components.
Source:  ILO (1993).  This table is based  on: (i) retum  of a special  ILO questionnaire  sent  to more than  200 countriesand  territories in April  1992.
(ii)  LABORSTA (STAT database),  (iii)  preliminary ILO estimates  and projections  of economically  active  population,  and (iv) United Nations
Population  Division.  Sex  and  Age  Distribution  of the  World's  Populations:  The  1992  revision  (1950-2025)(New  York. 1992).-7  -
By contrast to the ILO total, UNICEF  (1991) estimated  that there were 80 million
children aged 10-14 who undertook work so long or onerous that it interferes  with their normal
development. Such widely differing estimates for the same age group (10-14) show well the
implications  of different definitions  and methodologies.  This is furtffier  illustrated  by figures for
one country - India - from  the work of Weiner (1991):
"How many of India's 82 million  children  not in school  are in the
work  force?  Given  the  uncertainties of  definition and  the
complexities of remuneration, it is no wonder that estimates of
child labor vary so greatly in India. India's  1981 census reports
only  13.6  million  in  the  work  force  ...  other  studies  put  the
number of child workers higher. The official National Sample
Survey of 1983 reports 17.4 million  child laborers, while a study
by the Operations Research Group of Baroda, sponsored  by the
Labor  Ministry,  concluded that the child  labor force was 44
million, including children  paid in kind as well as in cash."
Thus estimates vary widely  depending  upon who makes the estimates. The basic
difficulty of course is that there is no systematic  data collection on child labor. Labor force
surveys typically  exclude respondents  below 15 years or below the upper mandatory  schooling
age, hence missing  the child labor phenomenon  entirely. Yet, as the aggregate  estimates  indicate,
there can be little doubt that in many parts of the world, child labor is pervasive. Table 2 shows
some selected estimates for Africa and Asia, based on micro-data collection, often of  an
anthropological  nature, which was undertaken  to study a variety  of household  behaviors. While
such estimates can make no clairn of representativeness,  they show that participation  rates for
children are often in the 20-60 percent range depending upon age and type of work.  Rates
increase with age and tend to be higher for boys in the case of wage-work  or work in the
household enterprise or farm. Girls participate more in domestic activities. Such figures suggestthat the incidence of child labor varies greatly from country to country, and possibly within
countries  as well, but they confirm  that the numbers  of children  working are high enough  so that
the issue of child labor deserves  to be a matter of priority concern in many countries.- 9 -
Table 2.  The incidence of child labor in selected countries.
Labor  force  participation  rate of children  (%)
Rural Egypt, 1975  Ages  6-11  17%
(Levy, 1985)  Ages 12-14  43%
Two villages  in rural Nigeria, 1992  Work  on farn  42-50%
(Okojie, 1993)  Work  at home  52-61%
Trading  24-27%
Craftwork  16-21%
Food  processing  26-30%
100 Villages  in Senegal  River  Valley, 1989  Apprendce:








Bicol region  in Philippines,  1983  Market  work:
(DeGraff  et al., 1993)  Age  7-12  22%
Age 13-17  44%
Home production:
Age  7-12  49%
Age 13-17  68%
Five villages  in rural Pakistan, 1990  Boys  19-25%
(Sathar, 1993)  Girls  22-32%
One district  in rural Maharashtra,  India  Household  work:
(Jejeebhoy,  1993)  Boys  34%
Girls  65%






Malaysia, 1980  Ages 10-14:  6%





Pakistan, 1985  Ages  10-14:
(Cochrane  et al.,  1990)  Boys  31%
Girls  7%
C6te d'Ivoire, 1986  Ages  10-14






Peru, 1986  Ages  10-14:
(Cochrane  et al., 1990)  Boys  41%
Girls  38%- 10  -
3.  Determinants  of Child  Labor
The absence  of systematic  data collection  on the incidence  of child  labor obviously
affects the amount of research done on the deterninants of child labor. Almost all
work done is based on case studies covering  a sub-national  area, often one or a few villages, at
best a province or region. Much of the analysis dates back to the period 1978-85,  perhaps
motivated by the United Nations' declaration  of 1979 as the Year of the Child.! More recent
case studies are reported by Bequele and Boyden (1988), Myers (1991), Jomo (1992), and
Goonesekere (1993).
The dearth of direct data on child labor has led many researchers  to focus on the
determinants of school  attendance.  As argued earlier, one cannot consider this as the "inverse"
of child labor, but nevertheless  this literature is important  because one can certainly  make the
argument that whatever promotes school attendance  is likely to deter child labor. Moreover,
empirically there is a negative  correlation  between  child labor and hours dedicated  to schooling
(Rivera-Batiz, 1985). Our discussion  of the determinants  of child labor therefore starts at the
literature on time allocation  within  the household.  This literature usually  treats the determination
of fertility and time allocation  of household  members,  especially labor supply, as a joint decision
(see e.g. Nakamura and Nakamura, 1992; Hotz and Miller,  1988; and Rivera-Batiz,  1985).
Obviously, the number of children in the household determines the potential  supply of child
labor, and hence fertility behavior is a determinant of the supply of child labor. Still on the
1. The ILO has put together  a verv useful  bibliography  which  covers the literature  during  this period  (ILO,
1986).- 11 -
supply side, we shall discuss next the role of risk management  in the household  as a factor
influencing  the amount of child labor. On the demand side, the two main determinants  of child
labor are the structure  of the labor market and the prevailing  production  technology.
Fertility, household  size, and time allocation
In  a utility maximizing household, regardless of the intrahousehold  decision
making process used to reach the maximization,  there exist competing  demands  on members'
time. A child's non-leisure  time is available for either schooling,  home production,  or income-
earning work in the market. The way the household  will allocate  the child's time depends  inter
alia on the household size and structure, the productive  potential  of the child and its parents
(mainly  its mother) in home  and market work, and the degree of substitution  possible  between
the child and its parents  (again, mainly the mother).  The time allocation  decision  is usually seen
as a joint decision with the  decision on the number  of children,  because  the latter determines  the
income potential from child labor, but this potential in turn determines  the desired household
size. Children's income potential stems both from their work as children and their income
transfers to the parents when they are old. 2
A recent review of the evidence on this relationship  from developing  countries
suggests that larger household  size reduces children's educational  participation  and progress in
school, and reduces parents' investment  in schooling  (Lloyd, 1994).  Both factors  make it likely
2.  Formal presentations of  the model of  the household economy which explicitly takes into account the
economic contributions of children can be found e.g. in Levy (1985), Rivera-Batiz (1985), and Sharif (1994). Much
of this work is based on Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977).- 12 -
that larger household  size increases  the probability  that a child will work. 3 Lloyd's review finds
that the magnitude  of this effect is determined  by at least four factors:
*  the level of socio-economic  development:  the effect of household  size is
larger in urban or more developed  areas;
*  the level of social expenditure  by the state: the effect of household  size is
smaller if state expenditures  are high;
e  family culture: the effect of household size is weaker where extended
family systems  exist (e.g. through  the practice of child fostering);
- the phase of demographic  transition:  the effect of household  size is larger
in later phases.
One implication is that the empirically observed magnitude of  the effect of
household size on child labor varies enormously from place to  place, depending upon the
combination of factors which exists (Cochrane  et al.,  1990). The evidence also suggests that
children with more siblings  are likely  to work longer hours on average,  especially  when they are
older and when they are girls (Lloyd, 1993; Jomo, 1992).
3. Education  and child work are only one dimension  of child welfare.  There exists a vast literature  which
has demonstrated  that  large family  size adversely  affects child  welfare  along  many dimensions:  health, intelligence,
physical  development,  etc. (see the review by King, 1987).- 13 -
A detailed econometric study for the  Philippines found that the relationship
between household size and child work is not the same for market and domestic work, and
depends on the sex and the birth order of the child (DeGraff et al., 1993). For example, the
presence of older siblings  decreases  the likelihood  of market work  by a child, especially  if it is
of the same  sex, suggesting  substitution  of older for younger siblings  (because  older children  are
likely to earn more). However, such substitution  effect was found to be absent for domestic
work. The results of this study also imply that the effects of high fertility on child labor are
more likely to be experienced  by first born children. This study as well as others (see Lloyd,
1993) document  gender  roles in child labor: in many settings  boys are more likely to be engaged
in market work and airls are more likely to be engaged in domestic  or farm work.
The degrees to  which boys or girls, or all children equally, are affected by
household size is  very  much a  cultural factor.  In  Malaysia, e.g.,  Chinese girls appear
disadvantaged  in larger households  but their brothers are not (Shreeniwas, 1993). In India,
families from urban slums in Tamil Nadu discriminate  in order to provide  a few  children,  mainly
boys, with "quality"  private education;  where mothers  enter the labor force, it is girls who must
stay at home. Families  from Uttar Pradesh  try to provide  all children  equally  with less expensive
public education  (Basu, 1993). In rural Maharashtra, if there are fewer younger  siblings, boys
benefit with more schooling  and less work, and girls must assume tasks traditionally  assigned
to boys (Jejeebhoy, 1993). In Pakistan, the presence of children under five in the household
significantly  reduces  the educational  participation  of girls, but not boys (Cochrane  et al., 1990).- 14 -
In rural areas, the relationship  between fertility, household  size, and child labor
depends  also on the amount  of land  holdings. The evidence  has indicated  that children  in landless
and marginal farm households  generally engage in wage labor while those in households  with
larger farms engage in agricultural work. The tendency  to engage in child labor increases  with
farm size, because the marginal contribution of children  increases (they are a complementary
input to land). This tendency reverses though where larger farm households  cease to operate
their own lands  but rather rent them out (Sharif, 1994).  In other words, both the size of the farm
and the mode of operation  will influence  the effect  of fertility  and household  size on child labor.
The literature on the determninants  of school  enrollment  has clearly  established  two
effects.  First,  there  is  a  substitution effect  between schooling of  girls  and  labor force
participation of mothers. When mothers go to work in the market, girls stay at home - in this
sense, the opportunity  cost of girls' schooling  is not their foregone wages, but those of their
mothers. Second, the most important determinants  of school  enrollment are parents' education
(especially mothers' education) and household income level. There is an income effect from
mothers' earnings which will at some point establish  a preference for "quality" children.
While reiterating our earlier caveat that child labor is not the inverse of school
enrollment, one could nevertheless  argue that similar substitution  and income effects, but with
opposite signs, operate with respect to child labor. What  this means is that in poor households,
when  mothers need  to enter the labor force, child labor  will increase  because especially  girls will
be pulled out of school to take over domestic work or their entry into school will be delayed.
As income increases,  the income  effect of the mother's work  will outweigh  the substitution  effect- 15 -
and child labor will decrease. This process will likely be affected  by the same societal  factors
identified above, namely the level of development, the level of social expenditure, cultural
factors, and the phase of demographic  transition. Most case studies of child labor do indeed
identify poverty of the household  and a low level of parental education  as important  factors in
determining child labor (ILO, 1992). The nature of parents' employment  also matters - if the
parents have irregular employment, it creates the need for additional  or more stable income
sources to be provided by children. Often too the parents work in the same occupation  as the
children (see e.g. the case studies in Bequele and Boyden, 1988, and Jomo, 1992).
Apart from the factors discussed  so far, which relate directly to the household's
behavior, the supply of child labor is also determined  by the characteristics  of the community
in which the household  lives, especially  the social infrastructure  available. It has been observed
in  Philippine and Sri Lankan villages that the presence of a day care center decreases the
likelihood that children engage in work at home (DeGraff  et al., 1993; Goonesekere,  1993).
It would  stand  to reason that the overall condition  of the education  system  can be
a powerful factor on the supply of child labor. Bonnet (1993) argues that the failure of the
education system in Africa has led many parents to view child labor as the preferred  option for
their children.  Education is no longer a road towards  obtaining a diploma which in turn leads
to  a modern sector job.  In an economic environment  where survival depends on work in the
informal sector,  many parents conclude that taking children out of school and putting them to
work is the most sensible solution for survival and the education method which offers the best- 16 -
prospects  for the future. As one African commentator  put it "Education  broadens  your mind but
it does not teach  you how to survive" (Agiobu-Kemmer,  1992).
This brings us to the role of the state. Several of the factors listed so far as
influencing  household's  behavior  with respect to child  labor are affected  by government  policies,
especially the level of social expenditure, the social infrastructure, even the overall level of
economic development.  Where economic development  is low, and society is characterized by
poverty and inequity, the incidence of child labor is likely to increase  as does the risk that it is
exploitative  (UNICEF, 1986).
The extent to which the state can influence  household's  child labor behavior, in
particular the effect of fertility and large household  size, is highlighted  in a study for Malaysia
(Shreeniwas, 1993). As part of  its policy to reduce ethnic inequalities, the Government of
Malaysia  systematically  favors education of Malay households  through scholarships  and other
subsidies. As a result no negative effects from household  size emerged  for these households in
contrast to Chinese and Indian households,  who did not benefit  from government  subsidies  and
among whom a strong negative effect of household  size on schooling  was observed.
.Among  general government policies that can affect child labor. two should be
highlighted:  structural adjustment  and population  policies. Economic  adjustment  may include a
reduction and restructuring of  government expenditure. The effect of this on the level and
allocation  of social expenditure  can, as the Malaysia  example illustrates,  have profound effects
on child labor. The general  argument for favoring primary education and for imparting a pro-- 17 -
poor orientation  of subsidies  and service provision  applies  here as well. Such policy orientations
are  likely to  reduce the supply of child labor in addition to their other intended benefits.
Regarding population  policy, the role of fertility and household  size as a determinant  of child
labor indicates  that rapid population  growth and a situation  where a large and growing share of
the population is less than 15 years old are detrimental  to school enrollment and are likely to
increase child labor. Among their many other benefits, family planning and other population
policies will include reduced child labor.
The final supply determinant  of child labor relates to the labor market itself. The
supply of child labor is determined  by the wage level in the market - both the wages of children
and those of adults. Evidence from Egypt and India suggests that the own-wage elasticity of
child labor is positive and higher for younger  children. For rural India, the own-wage  elasticity
was estimated at about 0.8. In the case of Egypt own-wage  elasticity was estimated at .965 for
children aged 6-11 and .379 for children aged 12-14. The cross-wage  elasticity with the labor
supply of the mother was found to be negative, i.e. an increase  in wages for females is likely
to reduce the supply of child labor, especially  of female children. The effect is strongest for
younger  children. In Egypt, a 10 percent increase  in women's market wages would lead to a 15
percent decline in the labor of children aged 12-14 and a 27 percent decline in the labor of
children  aged 6-11. In India, a 10 percent increase  in women's wage rates would  decrease  girls'
labor force participation  by 9-10 percent, but have no effect  on boys' participation.  The opposite
is true for men's wage rates which have a cross-wage  elasticity  of about -1 with respect  to boys'
labor supply, but close to zero for girls' labor supply (Levy, 1985, Rosenzweig, 1981). The
question which remains unanswered is at which income level the income effect from parents'- 18  -
labor force participation, especially that of the mother, will outweigh  the substitution  effect
(which suggests that mothers' labor force participation will result in increased child labor,
especially of girls).
Household  Attitudes  Towards Risk
Households  send  children  to work in order to augment  household  income  but also
to manage  better the income  risk they face. Child labor is part of a strategy  to minimize  the risk
of interruption  of the income stream, and hence to reduce  the potential  impact  of job loss, failed
harvest, etc. (Cain and Mozumder, 1980). This impact is more severe for poor households,
whose level of income is so low that any interruption  can be life threatening,  particularly  since
they usually have no savings or liquid assets and are not able to borrow (Mendelievich,  1979).
Therefore the risk argument also explains why child labor is more prevalent among poor
households. For poor households, child labor is rational behavior as part of a diversification
strategy of their portfolio  of income  sources. This remains  so even  if, in the current time period,
the income of the child is not needed  to reach the household's subsistence  income level.
This line of reasoning is similar to why poor some farmers have been found
reluctant to adopt certain  new hybrid seeds, even though such seeds hold the promise of greater
harvests (Lipton, 1989). The problem arises when new seeds increase average  harvests but at
the same time increase variability  and risk. Farmers who live close to the subsistence  level
cannot afford any downward  variability  and hence it is rational  for them to reject the new seeds
even if it means foregoing higher average revenues in the future. In the case of children, the- 19  -
contribution of children to the immediate  reduction of income risk is preferred to the future
higher income stream which could be earned by educated  children. 4
Evidence from rural India confirms that child labor plays a significant  role in the
self-insurance strategy of  poor households. It  was observed that  when the  variability of
household income increased (measured by the decline in income from peak season to  low
season), children's school attendance  declined. This was especially the case when a 'shock'
occurred which was external  to the village,  in other words there is evidence  of some risk sharing
within the village. Small households  suffer more from such shocks  because their lower number
of children makes them less able to insure themselves  (Jacoby  and Skoufias, 1994).
The policy implication  is that in settings  where  household  risk management  is an
important  reason behind  child labor, attempts  at forced abolition  of child labor (whether  through
child labor legislation  or compulsory  schooling  laws) are likely  to fail, since this would threaten
the household's survival, and need to be accompanied  by mechanisms which can provide
households  with insurance  against income fluctuations  in other ways, e.g. by short-term credit
which does not require collateral.
4. Notice that this income-insurance  argument  is not the same  as the old-age  insurance  argument:  parents
want to have children so that they will take care of them in their old age. This argument  explains  a high demand
for children, but not child labor. In fact, it should  induce parents  to send  children  to school  since  that  would  increase
their earnings and hence the potential  transfers  thev can provide  for their parents in their old age.- 20 -
The Structure of the Labor Market
Cain and Mozumder  (1980)  have argued  that the economic  value of children, and
the implications  for reproductive  behavior, cannot properly be assessed  without  reference  to the
structure of the labor  market.  The latter  determines the level of wages, which  in turn determines
the contribution  of children  to household income. A key factor is the flexibility of wages. In
competitive  markets, where wages are flexible, children  can substitute  for adults in the market
place. Where  wages are at a floor, whether due to legislation,  collective  action  or because  they
have reached  an (adult)  subsistence  minimum,  the employer will prefer adult workers (assuming
their productivity  is higher  than  that of children). Effective  minimum  wages  can thus in principle
deter child labor, although  in practice one must ask whether minimum  wage legislation  is more
likely to be effectively  enforced  than legislation banning child labor.
Various forms of  market segmentation, ironically, may reduce child labor.
Exploitation  and wage  discrimination  against  children  will reduce the returns  to child labor, and
hence the supply. There is little hard evidence on the extent of wage discrimination  against
children. Cain  and Mozumder  (1980)  present  evidence  that in rural Bangladesh,  where  children's
work is paid by the piece, there is no evidence of wage discrimination  relative to what adults
receive for the same work. In a review of case studies, Bequele  and Boyden  (1988) observed
that it was extremely  difficult  to obtain  precise data on levels of remuneration  of child laborers,
in part because the information  is very sensitive, but also because  children's wages tend to be
paid in a combination  of cash and kind. Sometimes  payment is made by the task and is subject
to deductions  for defects in the product, late delivery,  time lost through  ill health,  etc. However,- 21 -
in spite  of these difficulties  in observing  remuneration  levels,  Bequele  and Boyden  conclude  that
children's earnings  are consistently  lower than those of adults, even where the two groups are
engaged in the same tasks. Jomo (1992) reaches the same conclusion based on several case
studies  on Malaysia.  If wage  discrimination  against  children  is indeed  the norm, one would have
to surmise that the wage elasticity of child labor supply is quite low, since none of the case
studies reported any difficulties on the part of the employers  to recruit children. This is the
opposite of what the two econometric analyses cited earlier found.
Monopsonistic demand conditions in the market will also depress children's
wages. Monopsonistic  conditions occur often in developing  country  labor markets and can be
due  to  concentrated ownership of  land,  credit  and product monopolies, share  cropping
arrangements,  imposed or natural restrictions  on labor mobility, or, simply  because of lack of
alternative employment  possibilities (Cain and Mozumder, 1980).  Possibilities of mobility or
finding alternative  employment  are often lower for children  than  adults. In such conditions, the
children's wage  is determined  mainly by the elasticity  of supply.  As said earlier, evidence from
Egypt and India  suggests  that children's labor supply is elastic  with  respect to their wages (Levy,
1985, Rosenzweig,  1981) but other case studies cast doubt on it.
The relative importance  of the formal sector in the economy  and the degree of
segmentation  with the informal sector also determines the demand for child labor. In general,
the evidence  suggests  that the amount of child labor in the formal economy is small, with the
possible  exception  of plantations  (see e.g. Bonnet, 1993. for Africa;  Goonesekere, 1993, for Sri
Lanka). However,  in many countries  there is a tendencv  towards  "informalization"  of production- 22 -
methods. Formal enterprises  either break up in smaller units or engage  in sub-contracting  with
households  or informal  enterprises  (mainly  to try to escape  social legislation  which adds to the
cost of labor). In such conditions  the demand for child labor may well increase.
An important  aspect of this is the apprenticeship  system,  which ties a child to a
small enterprise usually  for many years, in principle to learn a trade. In practice,  especially in
the early years of the apprenticeship,  the child often serves "the master", and only later will
there be any actual  learning  (Mendelievich,  1979). Nevertheless,  the apprenticeship  cau be seen
as a process of socialization  together  with a transfer of know-know,  and some  have argued that
it would therefore be a mistake  to view it as exploitation  of child labor (Bonnet,  1993).
The role of technology
The second  major factor  determining  the demand  for child  labor is the technology
of production. This factor becomes more relevant the less children  are perfect substitutes for
adults. Many of the cases where this factor plays an extreme  role are those that incite reports
in the press and by civic societies.  Examples  are the use of boys in mines, because the tunnels
are too small for adults  to crawl through; the use of boys as chimney  sweeps; the use of girls
to weed and pick  cotton;  the use of children  to weave  carpets  because  children  have more  nimble
fingers and can tie smaller  knots than adults.
By imnplication,  changes in  technology can have a profound impact on  the
incidence of child labor. The green revolution  in India led to reduced  child labor and increased- 23 -
school attendance  (Rosenzweig, 1981).  The mechanization  of Egyptian agriculture, especially
the growing use of tractors and irrigation  pumps, reduced  the demand for child labor in tasks
such as driving animals to power waterwheels,  picking cotton, and hauling freight borne by
donkeys (Levy, 1985). In some cases, the technological  change in question can  be fairly
elementary.  DeGraff  et al. (1993)  document  that  in the Philippines,  the introduction  of electricity
in the community reduces the amount of market labor for children, and,  similarly, having
electricity  in the home reduces the amount of home  production  by children. In the quarries of
Bogota,  the introduction  of wheelbarrows  displaced  children  who  previously  carried rocks piece
by piece (Salazar, 1988).
Technological  change  has also been credited  in part with the elimination
of child labor in Europe following the industrial revolution.  In the textile industry e.g.  the
mechanization  of spinning and weaving wiped out the family mode of textile production and
increased the specialization  of work in the factories.  This reduced  the demand for child labor
and increased  the demand  for skilled  labor. It is important  to note  that the reduction of the share
of children  in the workforce  in Europe's eighteenth-century  textile  industry  occurred prior to the
introduction  of legislative  restrictions  on child labor (Galbi, 1994).
Today's technology  can have ambivalent  effects  on the demand for child work.
The miniaturization  and assembly-line  production in the electronics and electrical appliance
industries  has again led to some demand  for "nimble  fingers". Not everywhere are robots the
ultimate  suppliers  of this skill. In garment  production,  the advent  of fairly cheap multi-function
sewing  machines  has once  again made possible  home  production.  and much manufacturing  relies- 24 -
on sub-contracting  arrangements,  often  leading to girls' work at home. Empirical  assessments
of  the  imnplications  of technological  change are  lacking and would be needed before the
importance  of technology  relative  to other demand factors  can be assessed.
Lastly, we should  point at the possibility  that the causal relation  between child
labor and technological  change  also  works the other way around: effective  enforcement  of child
labor laws could force entrepreneurs  to adopt technologies  which no longer rely on the use of
children. There seem to be no documented  cases of this effect though, and we expect that it
would only come into play in situations  where other factors  had already reduced the demand  for
child labor and\or initiated  a process of technological  change.
4.  The Welfare Economics  of Child Labor
Having discussed  some  of the key determinants  of child labor, in the next section
we will discuss policy interventions  to reduce child labor. But to seek to reduce or even ban
child labor must be based on a conviction  that there is "too much" of it relative to the social
optimum. Whether or not there is too much or too little of an activity can be examined
systematically  using the framework  of conventional  welfare economics  - such an analysis  may
also provide insights into appropriate  interventions.  This section outlines a discussion  of the
issues.
The basic analvtical  framework is that of household decision making in the
allocation  of children's time between  labor  and non-labor  activities,  together  with an assessment- 25 -
of private and social returns to each activity. Each household will allocate the time of its
children to  wherever the  perceived private return is  highest, until the marginal return  is
equalized across all uses of child time. The crucial question is whether the marginal social
return,  suitably  defined, is also equalized.
Conceptually,  there are three sets of issues. First there are those  to do with pure
efficiency, where no distributional  questions are raised. Secondly,  there are issues involving
intrahousehold  distnbutional  considerations.  Third, there are the issues  involving  interhousehold
distribution. We consider  each of these in isolation.
Let us start with a state of affairs where all household  are identical,  so that there
are  no  interhousehold  distributional issues at  all.  Let us  also assume that there are  no
intrahousehold  allocation  issues - households  give the same weight  to the welfare of children
as  the  social welfare function. In  such a  situation, the  only remaining issue for welfare
economics  is that of efficiency of the allocation  of children  's time, emerging  out of some sort
of market failure either in the market for child labor, or in other markets.
Thus, suppose  there is a failure in the market for education.  The social returns
to primary education  are higher than the private returns, for whatever  reason (which may be
quite indirect e.g. primary education  for girls leads to lower fertility  and this is desirable  from
the social point of view). Thus in the social optimum  more children  would  be at school  than at
work (in the family or outside).  What should  be the nature of the intervention? Basic  welfare
economics  teaches us that it is best to attack market failures  in the very markets in which they- 26 -
occur -- it is always second  best to intervene  in related markets.  The lesson  here would  be that
it is second best to attack the problem by taxing or banning child labor (thereby inducing  the
household  to use that time in alternative  ways). Rather,  policy  should  focus on raising  the private
rate of returns to education  to bring it closer to the social  returns, because  child labor is merely
the symptom  of a market  failure  elsewhere. The same applies  in cases  where incomplete  markets
for risk spreading  lead to the use of child labor as a diversification  device.  The first best solution
is to  encourage the development  of credit and risk markets. There is no presumption  that
banning of child labor, for example, is the appropriate  response  to this market failure.
Now take the case where the market for child labor is monopsonistic,  so that the
wages for child labor are depressed  below the efficient  competitive  level. Minimum  wages in
such a market will of course  raise wages and increase  the employment  of children. Note that in
this case the efficient  direction  of movement  is to increase  child labor -- this also increases  the
wages of children, which raises distnbutional  issues, and it is to these that we now turn.
Let us start with a case where all households  are identical, but within each
household  there is discrimination  against  children  -- meaning  by this  that the household  objective
function gives a lower weight  to the utility of children than the social welfare function (the
argument is perhaps most persuasive  in the case of female  children). Then, even if there is no
market failure of the conventional  type, and there are no interhousehold  distributional  issues,
there may nevertheless  be "too much" child labor. It is, however, important to model the
intrahousehold allocation process  accurately, since the  policy interventions will differ
accordingly.  Suppose we have the "unitary" model of the household  where the head of the- 27 -
household  gives greater weight to the cash income generated, and less weight to the loss of
leisure and schooling  by the child, than the social welfare function  does. In this case the issue
is how to rearrange  incentives  for the head of household  so that he does "the right thing". This
can be done either  by "taxing' (perhaps  even banning)  child labor or by subsidizing  education.
There is no longer a natural ranking  between these two alternatives.  However,  now  consider  the
case where household allocations are better descnbed through a bargaining  model (perhaps
between the father and the mother-child  nexus). Then directly  altering  the bargaining  power of
the mother is a relevant instnument.  Increasing wages, even to the child, can then be seen as
strengthening  the fall-back  option of the mother-child  nexus.
We now focus on the situation  where there are no market failures and there are
no intrahousehold  issues, but households  differ in their wealth  and  capabilities,  thereby  leading
to a distribution  of outcomes in welfare..  In what sense might there now be "too much" child
labor?  The answer is that it may be the case that child labor is correlated  with low income
households,  and a reduction  in household  poverty leads  to a reduction  in child labor. Notice  that
child labor is not here an independent  object of concern - rather, it is simply  a manifestation
of low household  income. Child labor, therefore, far from being banned, should be used as a
targeting device. Interventions should be planned which transfer resources (nutrition, for
example)  to child laborers, since this is the way to transfer resources  to poor households.  Of
course such intervention  may well lead to  an increase in child labor, but that should not
necessarily  worry us from this perspective -- so much the better, if the object is to help poor
households  and if the poverty alleviation  effects dominate  the incentive  effects.- 28 -
With this framework,  let us now  work  through  and pull together  the consequences
of a particularly  popular policy intervention  - the banning  of child  labor.  There are two cases
to consider: one where the ban is enforced, and one where is not.
If the ban is enforced, this means that children will no longer be found in the
labor market, but will be shifted to family labor or to schooling.  If there was previously an
inefficiency  in the education  market, so that there were too few  children  in school  from the point
of view of the social optimum, then this will move us closer to that optimuin  but, as discussed
above, it would definitely have been better to have intervened  in the education  market.
But what if there was no inefficiency in  the education market?  From the
perspective  of pure intrahousehold  distribution,  suppose  it was the case that putting  children  into
the labor market gave them a lower level of welfare than putting them in school, but this was
done because the household head preferred to put them there to get the cash incomes. Then
forcing  the ban on child labor is good if the social welfare  function  gives  a higher weight  to the
child's welfare than the head of household  does. But what if child welfare depends  on the cash
income of the child because this is what strengthens  the bargaining  power of the mother-child
nexus?  Then, of course, barning of child labor may make the child worse off after the
intrahousehold  bargaining is completed.
Now take the case  where the problem  is one of interhousehold  distribution,  where
poorer households  send their children  out to work, but wealthier  households  send their children
to school  -- the two decisions  being rational  given  the wealth  levels of the two households.  Then- 29 -
it should be clear that a ban on child labor makes the poor household  worse off since it is a
restriction of its oppormuity set - much better to target transfers conditional  on child labor
(which will, paradoxically, increase child labor).
Suppose, as is quite likely, that the ban is not enforced,  but the ban creates rents
in the system. Quite simply, if employers  are the ones who would be fined, they bnrbe the
policemen etc. to let them continue, but this is an extra cost to them. This will reduce the
demand for child labor and, in a competitive  setting, will reduce the wages of children and
reduce the extent of child labor. The consequences  can once again be thought through for
efficiency, intrahousehold  equity and interhousehold  equity.
To the extent that more children now go to school this will move the system
closer to efficiency if the market failure is in the market for education  -- but once again, it
would have been better to intervene in that market directly. To the extent that the head of
household  was sending  the child into the labor market  against  its better interest,  the lower wages
will force a reallocation  to schooling  which will increase  the child's welfare. But to the extent
that intrahousehold  allocation is governed  by bargaining  power and cash income confers this
power, the child will be worse off. Finally, to the extent that poorer households send their
children to  work based on  rational decisions which do not entail intrahousehold inequity,
lowering the wages of child labor will make these poorer households  worse off.
The welfare economics  of child labor  thus leads to a complex  and richly textured
analysis  which does not suggest  a single, or even  a dominant,  wvay  of approaching  the issue. An- 30  -
array  of policy instruments  is likely to be required, addressing different aspects of failures
arising  from efficiency or  distributional  considerations. In  particular,  it  seems clear that
legislation, even if it could be enforced,  is at best only one instrument in an array that has to
be used.
There is however, a major counter to the "welfare economics' perspective  on
child labor. This is the 'non-welfarist" framework where certain "rights" are self-evident,
natural and given. Policy analysis  has to take these as constraints and proceed on this basis. A
good example is slavery. It is generally  accepted  that  nobody has the right to sell themselves  into
slavery - irrespective  of whether  this would  be welfare improving from the efficiency  (or even
the distributional)  point of view. It can be argued  that child labor falls into this category. The
fact of child labor violates a basic human  riaht, and it should be banned. It is also easy to see
how a  focus on international  conventions  and legislation emerges from the  'basic  rights"
perspective. Not only is the signing  of conventions  and passing of legislation  symbolic  - a clear
expression of the acceptance  of the right in question  - but vigorous attempts at enforcing  such
legislation are seen as furthering  a basic right. In this framework, the fact that attempts to
enforce legislation  may hurt the very group whose right is being protected is not as important
a consideration.
Legislation  can also, of course, be justified in a welfare economics  framework,
though its efficacy has to be heavily qualified.  But from both the  "welfarist" and the "non-
welfarist" point of view the key issue  has to be one of enforceability. As we will discuss in the
next section, most developing  countries  simply  do not have the administrative  capacity  to enforce- 31 -
the full gamut  of child labor  legislation,  in the face of overwhelming  incentives  for the existence
of child labor. In fact, what capacity exists is probably too thinly spread to have an effect.
Moreover, the fact of the legislation  makes it more difficult  to put in place other interventions  -
- since child labor is not  supposed  to exist if the legislation  is being enforced.  And added to the
above is the fact that in many  societies  certain  types of child  labor, even if exacting, are not seen
as a violation  of children's rights. On the contrary, apprenticeship,  work on the farm, etc. is
seen as an important  rite of passage.
Putting together these arguments, we would argue that while it is certainly
appropriate  for nations  to accede  to international  conventions  as a statement  of overall  objectives,
specific  legislation  on child labor should  be tailored to their enforcement  capacity,  and directed
to what might  be termed  the extremes - as seen by society. Thus, for example, child prostitution
would  be accepted  universally  as a candidate  for legislation  and  targeted  heavy enforcement.  The
same would  apply  to children  in bonded labor. But when it comes  to children  working on farms,
or even factories, a better approach is to provide incentives  for schooling,  and to use the fact
of child labor as a targeting  device to transfer resources to the child and its family  - to focus,
in other words, on drawing  children away from labor but protecting  them when they do find
themselves  at work.
5.  Policy Intervention
The foregoing  discussion  brought out a number  of variables  which  can be affected
by economic  and social  policies. Let us start with fertility. Ceteris paribus, where the number- 32 -
of children is reduced the amount  of child labor will decrease. This is not the place to review
what works and does not work in family  planning  and population  policies (for a recent review,
see.  ), and it suffices  to underline  the importance  of such  policies  as a tool to reduce  child
labor. Moreover, the relationship  between fertility and child labor becomes stronger in later
phases of demographic  transition,  so that the effect of population  policies on reduction  of child
labor will increase over time.
Child labor is strongly  associated  with poverty. Poor households  need children's
income to  survive and/or to  insure against unforeseen income losses. Successful poverty
alleviation  policies (see  e.g. the recommendations  in World  Bank, 1990) will thus tend  to reduce
child labor. Since in most countries  poverty alleviation  is a long-term objective, short term
actions aimed at reducing income  risk for poor households  will also have beneficial  effects on
child labor. Examples are the provision of agricultural  credit or credit for small household
enterprises, or other policies which provide insurance  against income loss (e.g. by granting
flexible repayment terms of existing loans, or providing  community-backed  consumer loans
without  collateral). Such programs  would  contribute  to brealdng  the bonds which caused  bonded
child labor in areas where it is now prevalent.
We  cited several examples earlier in the paper where technological change
contributed to the reduction of child labor (mechanization  and changes in cropping patterns in
agriculture, mechanization  in carpet weaving,  introduction  of wheelbarrows  in quarrying,  etc.).
Programs to promote adoption of such technologies  obviously  deserve a place in the list of
policy instruments to reduce child labor.- 33 -
The benefits of educating girls for child welfare are well known. One of those
benefits is the reduction  of child labor, through the income effect stemming  from an enhanced
contribution by an educated mother to her family's income, and the associated  demand for
'quality"  children, i.e. children  who do not work but go to school.
Since school  attendance  and work are the main competing  claims on the child's
time, the balance  can be shifted in favor of school attendance  by reducing  its cost. Direct  costs
can be reduced  through  subsidies  and indirect costs by bringing  schools  closer  to the children's
homes. Moreover,  where  costs of education  are low, the negative  effects  from large household
size on school attendance  can be largely offset, and this is likely to reduce  the supply  of child
labor. This consideration  is especially  important  in an era of economic  adjustment  where  many
countries need to cut levels of government expenditure, including  often social expenditure.
Maintainina measures  which  keep the cost of education  low for poor households  makes sense
not only from a pure educational  perspective  but also as a tool to diminish  child labor. The way
education is provided  can also be made more flexible  to meet the needs  of working  children.  In
particular, evening and weekend classes, and schools near the work place, would promote
attendance.  Informal  and vocational  education  will often attract  the children  more and provide
skills they can more easily relate to.
Last, but not least among economic  measures  with an impact  on child labor  is the
provision of alternmative  income sources for children and improved  employment  opportunities
for their parents. This is of course affected by  the overall state of the economv, and the
government's  e:onomic  policies, especially  those relating  to employment  and the labor  market.- 34 -
An  interesting program which combined  social and economic incentives was
sponsored  by ILO in Manila to help scavenger children  working on "Smokey Mountain'  -
Manila's infamous garbage  dump.  The  program attempted to  provide children with  an
alternative,  more safe, source of income to scavenging  garbage,  and provided training  and credit
to their parents to help them set up small businesses.  Initially  the program failed, but after a
more intensive approach, a small number of children  were effectively  helped. The program
illustrated  that the key to success is to provide alternatives to both the economic and social  Upay-
offs'  of children's work, but it also showed  that it is difficult  and costly to do this, and depends
critically on local community involvement (Gunn and Ostos, 1992). This experience in the
Philippines has been shared by  other programs also: community  operated multiple-service
programs  providing  alternative  employment  for children  as well  as education  and health  services,
have had some success but typically  with limited  coverage.  They are resource-demanding  and
complicated  to operate (Myers, 1991).
Finally, let us turn to legislation. Historically,  the single most imnportant  and
common  approach to the problem of child labor has been the adoption  of legislation.  The ILO
has sponsored  many Conventions  and Recommendations  banning  child labor and most countries
now have some form of legislation  or regulation  prohibiting  the employment  of children  below
a certain  age and specifying  the conditions  under which  minors  may work (Bequele  and Boyden,
1988). The age threshold  and the scope of the legislation  vary. In the majority of countries  the
minimum  age for entry to employment  is 14 or 15, but there are about 30 countries  where it is
only 12 or 13 years (ILO, 1992). In many countries  higher  minimum  ages apply for hazardous- 35 -
work. Almost all legislation  exempts work in household  enterprises,  but some limit  the scope
furither  by excluding  also domestic service and agriculture.
One fundamental  problem with enacting and enforcing  legislation  banning  child
labor is that there are no  interest groups to  support it:  the government often considers it
embarrassing  to admit the existence  of child labor, the employers  of children  will obviously  be
hostile to legislation,  and the children themselves  and their parents are usually  not organized
(Morice, 1981). Legislation is therefore likely to be effective only where there is a capable
administration,  determined  to implement  the laws, where there is relative difficulty  in hiding
child work, and relatively little advantage  from child work (Rodgers  and Standing,  1981).  This
situation, especially  the last factor, existed  in the cotton  mills of eighteenth-century  Europe.  The
employment of children started falling a half century before the introduction  of legislation,
mainly because it  was to  the  advantage of  factory owners to  switch to  adult workers.
Particularly, the growth  of the cotton industry  drove up the wages  of children,  and the maturing
of  child workers produced a  labor market for productive adults, where transaction costs
associated  with hiring and screening adult workers fell (Galbi, 1994). Legislation  to ban child
labor thus fitted in with an ongoing  economic  trend.
Documentation  about effective  enforcement  of child labor legislation  is spotty  at
best. Most information  pertains to labor inspectors  describing  their degree of understaffmng  and
their difficulties  to visit factories and to  enforce penalties before the courts. There is little
question  that in many  countries, labor inspectorates  are seriously  understaffed.  In the Philippines
e.g. there are fewer  than 200 inspectors  nation-wide  for almost  400.000  emplove-s  (Bequele  and- 36 -
Boyden, 1988).5  The ongoing trend towards "informalization"  in the labor market will make
inspection  even more difficult in the future. In fact, it has been  argued that in some cases child
labor legislation  may have contributed to this process, because  it makes it easier for employers
to hide child laborers (Bequele and Boyden, 1988).
Weak enforcement does not of course provide an argument for not passing
legislation.  Apart from its symbolic value, it can be argued  that legislation is the only way to
effectively  address some of the more extreme cases of child work, such as prostitution, child
soldiers,  etc. However, the legislation  cannot  be seen in isolation  from enforcement  capacity (see
Box 2). Where such capacity is limited, it needs to be concentrated  on those cases where
economic  incentives  are not likely to have much impact.
5. A detailed and interesting description  of enforcement  problems  and issues in the case of Sri Lanka is
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In putting in place child labor legislation,  an argument  can be made for using a
graduated approach. As Rodgers and Standing (1981) pointed  out 'it  is one of the ironies of
child labor that, where  it is prohibited by  law,  the law is likely to  leave child workers
unprotected,  since legally they do not exist'  (p. 39). The law should  hence address also issues
of working conditions (safety, working hours, etc.) and ensure that these regulations apply to
all workers, including children. It may be easier, in a first phase, to force employers to limit
children's workdays,  to provide adequat'e  lighting  or safety  equipment,  rather than to force them
to forego child labor altogether. (However, for an opposing  view, see Goonesekere, 1993, who
argues that a gradual approach leads to confusion and is harder to implement  than absolute
prohibition.)  Similarly, outlawing  certain practices in general,  e.g. bonded labor as a means to
repay credit, may have a beneficial effect for children,  even  when  it falls  short of stopping child
labor.
Legislation  can also affect child labor through  compulsory  schooling  laws. The
record of enforcement seems better here than with legislation  banning child labor (Weiner,
1991).  However,  here too, a certain level of enforcement  capacity  is needed,  not  just in the form
of inspectors  but also a well functioning  birth registration  system,  a high level of literacy, etc.
The community  has a potentially  crucial role here, since  community-based  monitoring  of school
enrollment  and attendance  is more likely to succeed  than occasional  visits from an inspector of
the Ministry of Education. (Weiner, 1991, illustrates  these points for the case of Europe and
North America.)- 39 -
Ultimately then, and as was argued in the previous section, child labor is best
addressed  through a  combination of  legislation and economic incentives  (Myers,  1991;
Goonesekere, 1993). This is now  well  accepted  by international  agencies addressing  the problem
of child labor, such as UNICEF and ILO (see e.g. UNICEF, 1986; 1LO, 1992). It is unlikely
that any one approach will succeed  everywhere  and the balance between legal and economic
measures needs to be adapted to the incidence  of child labor, the type of prevalent work and
work arrangements, and the conditions  of the markets. To illustrate this we revisit the four
prototypical child workers we described  earlier, and  suggest  ways  to help them and their families
(Box 3).-40  -
Box 3. Four child  workers:  How t  help  ihem?
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demonstrte that  it can  be com  wined  with  schooling  achievements.  The latter  are  jeopardized  when childreiwork tDoomany  hours. Rather
than banin  tbe actvi y, the law  -right focus  on restictng trading hours.  In order  to'  protect  the chidren, some  of their tradn  places
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Juan, quarr  worker  in Bogolf::  ......
Juan's work on the quarry is necessitated  because  his father  bas no education  and can only obtain employmern-
irregularly.  Juan's  work is par of te  fay's  survival  strategy.  Moreover,  his parents  do not perceive  education  to have  a high pay-off
in view of Colombia's  econormic  situaton, especially  high unemploymenL  The improvement  in this situation  is cleariy the long-term
objective  of Colomnbia's  process  of economnic  reform.  Juan's father  may not benefit  much  from any such improvement  because  he lacks.
basic skills..  A traiinig program  aimed  at the poor squatter  aeas  may help. Since  nany of the children  in the quarry do go to school.
school meals  and free  shoes and  clothing  (which  many  families  cannot  afford)  could  increase  attendance.
It was observed  that even  simple  technological  improvements,  such  as the use of wheelbarrows  had reduced  the
demand for child  labor (previously  children  carried  the stones piece  by piece).  The introduction  of dump trucks further  accentuated  the
displacement  of child  workers.  The  government  could  promote  the adoption  of these  innovations.  perhaps  by small subsidies. his would
enhance  the demand  for adult  workers  from the same  squatting  areas (who  traditionally  work in quarrying  activides).
Colombia  has a law prohibiting  the employment  of children  under IS years old in mining and extraction.  The
quarries never receive  a visit ftom an inspector  of the Ministry of Labor. Stepping  up inspecion efforts wil not help as long as the
economic  needs  of the families  are as dire as they are. Attempts  to involve  the  community  more in ensuring  that each child receives  at
least a part-ime education,  and providing  some in-kind  benefits at the school,  may be the only realistic  way to help the child quarry
workers  in Bogod in the  current economic  situation.
Taeng, massezue in Bangkok
Taeng,  and many  girls in her situation  come from  poor farming  villages  with insufficient  economic  opportunities.
Creating  more means  of income  is the prime  challenge  here to reduce  the supply  of girls  being sent to Bangkok.  Improved  agriculturl
extension,  double  cropping,  new  cash  crops.  all will  help. Opening  up opportunides  outside  agriculture  would both increase  income  and
reduce income  vulnerability.  Improving  access  to credit for tde farmers  from anotber  source  than the 'agent'  would avoid that child
prostitution  becomes  the means  to pay off a loan.
On  the legislative  side,  the probiem  is enforcement,  since  prostitution  is illegal  in  Thailand.  The  difference  berween
the law and the reality  is such that enforcement  needs  to be focused  on child  prostitutes.  In view of a growing  health problem  (AIDS.
drug use) among  prostitutes,  free medical  services  wo  those below 18  years  of age would  be a case in point where  the illegal activity  can
be used as targe-ing  device.- 41  -
Brazil and India have both followed  approaches  which combine legal action  with
economic incentives. In India, the legal framework  is provided by the 1986 Child Labor Act,
prohibiting the employment of children below 14 in hazardous occupations. The economic
framework  is in the National Policy  on Child Labor, which  targets education  for all children  up
to age 14, and proposes an extensive  system  of non-formal  education  combined  with employment
and income generating schemes  in areas with a high incidence  of child labor. A series of pilot
projects has been set up (Narayan, 1988).
In Brazil, the focus is on street children.  The Government  has recognized  that its
customary bureaucratic procedures would fail to effectively  address this problem. Instead, a
community-based  strategy was set up, where the Govermment's  role was limited to providing
technical support. By 1986, local volunteer  'commissions" existed in most major urban areas
who were able to mobilize  community-based  resources  (Myers, 1988).6
If economic  incentives  and legislation  are the two pillars on which efforts to help
working children need to be based, the effectiveness  of each will be greatly enhanced by
simultaneous  efforts at advocacy  and mobilization,  and empowerment  of the children and their
families. Because many of the most exploited  and endangered  working children go unnoticed,
their situation  must be brought forcefully  to the attention  of government  and the public. in an
effort to mobilize  a constituency  to defend  them. Advocacy  entails  combating  ignorance  but also
prejudice, fear and denigration  towards  working  children.  There is a great irony in such negative
6. For a further discussion on street children, see UNICEF, 1986; for a review of national and international
actions on behalf of street children, see Ta,on.  1991.- 42 -
views, because  working  children  often assume great responsibility  to help themselves  and their
families (Myers, 1991).  Many working children and their families  operate within very limited
economic and social options  - effective  empowerment  can expand  those options, and give the
children a larger share  of society's possibilities and benefits. Myers (1991)  discusses  ways to
achieve  this, most of which  are characterized  by a strong involvement  of local communities,  but
aided and supported  by national  or international  organizations.
As said, child labor has much negative stigma attached  to it, certainly among
government officials.  Sometimes  a more positive view can open a road to helping working
children more effectively.  In particular, it may be possible to use child labor as a targeting
device, and extend  certain  benefits  to child workers. As the previous  section indicated,  this is
especially appropriate  where child labor is a manifestation  of poverty.  Many working  children
are inadequately  fed and do not go to school. The government  could provide "factory meals"
to working children,  as it provides  in some cases school meals to children  in school. Similarly,
primary health  care  workers  could  be mandated to visit and provide  free care to child workers.
Employers  could  be ordered  to restrict children's work day to five or six hours so that children
can attend school at least part-time. Such measures would benefit childrcn who are in an
economic situation  which  is not likely to change in the short run and would  make them better
off. (In fact, the added  benefits may be perceived as an increase  in real wage and increase  the
supply of child labor  - this is not, however, a reason for not helping  child workers  and can be
seen as an effectively  targeted  transfer to poor families.)- 43 -
Such  programs  of  course  would require rather profound  shifts  in  many
governments'  current attitude  of denial andlor "all-or-nothing"  bans. We think that such gradual
solutions  which recognize an economic reality and take advantage  of it to help those in an
unfortunate  situation, will ultimately contnbute to the long-term  elimination  of child labor.
Finally, there are  other factors which we have not discussed yet,  which can
profoundly  affect the lives of children. One such factor is peace. We must make a distressing
call of attention  to the impact  of war and ethnic and civil strife on children. There is evidence
that increasingly  boys, sometimes  as young as 12 years, are being used in the fighting militias.
Often  they are abducted  and forcibly conscripted  (Goonesekere,  1993).  While in such situations,
civility and law enforcement are  absent, the use of children in  such conflicts should be
considered  a war crime not to be forgotten after the end of the conflict.
6.  Conclusion
On September  30, 1990, the first World  Summit  for Children  promised  to reduce
child mortality  and malnutrition,  and set targets to be reached  by the year 2000. There were no
explicit  goals  relating  to child labor, but the targets  included  basic education  for all children  and
completion  of primary education  by at least 80 percent of children. These goals, if met, will
reduce child labor.
Indeed, the evidence reviewed in this paper shows that education interventions
play a key role in the reduction  and eventual abolition  of child  labor. However, other measures- 44 -
are needed as well, such as fertility interventions, the adoption  of technology,  improvements  in
employment  opportunities  for adults, labor market policies,  and legislative  action.  Such  measures
need to be accompanied  with efforts at advocacy of the condition of working children, and
empowerment  of the children and their families.
There is an encouraging  consensus emerging  both in the literature and in the
policies of international  agencies  concerned with child labor, that effective  action  must aim in
the first place at protecting  the children  and improving  their living  and working  conditions.  This
implies  a less stigmatized  view of child labor, recognizing  e.g. that the condition  of child labor
can itself be used as a targeting device to help the children  with schooling,  health, nutrition  and
other interventions.  The long-term  objective  of elimination  of child  labor needs  to be approached
through a package of legislative  action and economic  and social incentives,  which take into
account  the types of child labor and child labor arrangements  present in a country, as well as
its institutional  and administrative  capacity.REFERENCES
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